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Theorists analyzing the concept of disease on the basis of the notion 
of dysfunction consider disease to be dysfunction requiring. More 
specifically, dysfunction-requiring theories of disease claim that for 
an individual to be diseased certain biological facts about it must 
be the case. Disease is not wholly a matter of evaluative attitudes. 
In this paper, I consider the dysfunction-requiring component of 
Wakefield’s hybrid account of disease in light of the artifactual 
organisms envisioned by current research in synthetic biology. 
In particular, I argue that the possibility of artifactual organisms 
and the case of oncomice and other bred or genetically modified 
strains of organism constitute a significant objection to Wakefield’s 
etiological account of the dysfunction requirement. I then develop 
a new alternative understanding of the dysfunction requirement 
that builds on the organizational theory of function. I conclude 
that my suggestion is superior to Wakefield’s theory because it (a) 
can accommodate both artifactual and naturally evolved organ-
isms, (b) avoids the possibility of there being a conflict between 
what an organismic part is supposed to do and the health of the 
organism, and (c) provides a nonarbitrary and practical way of 
determining whether dysfunction occurs.
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I. IntroDuCtIon
A persistent issue in the philosophy of medicine concerns the problem of 
defining disease. traditionally, analyses take one of three forms. naturalists 
(Kendell, 1975; Boorse, 1976b, 1977, 1997; Scadding, 1990) claim that disease 
should be defined in descriptive biological terms. normativists (margolis, 1976; 
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Goosens, 1980; Sedgwick, 1982; engelhardt, 1986) argue that disease judg-
ments express views about the value and desirability of the states in ques-
tion. Finally, hybrid views (reznek, 1987; Caplan, 1992; Wakefield, 1992) 
suggest that a satisfactory analysis of the concepts of health and disease 
has both a naturalistic and an evaluative component. All three approaches 
face significant challenges, and it has been suggested that instead of being 
preoccupied with finding the correct definition and analysis of these con-
cepts, we should instead focus our effort on providing a “philosophi-
cal explication” of disease (Schwartz, 2004, 2007a) or heed a distinction 
between state descriptions and normative claims when considering con-
troversial medical cases such as deafness and alcoholism (ereshefsky, 
2009). It is the traditional question that will make up the framework of 
this paper. In particular, I will focus on what Schwartz (2007a, 2007b) calls 
the dysfunction requirement, according to which biological dysfunction is 
necessary for disease. Both Boorse and Wakefield’s criteria of disease refer 
to biological dysfunction. However, their understanding of the dysfunc-
tion requirement differs in that they accept different theories of biological 
function. In this paper, I discuss Wakefield’s description of the dysfunc-
tion requirement in terms of the etiological theory of biological function. 
my criticism of Wakefield is based on two cases that I think reveal some 
significant shortcomings of Wakefield’s characterization of the dysfunction 
requirement.
one problem arises when considering disease in the context of cur-
rent research in synthetic biology. Synthetic biologists aim to design and 
produce novel organismic parts, processes, and systems tailor-made to 
serve human purposes. However, due to their lack of evolutionary history, 
such possible, though not as yet existing, artifactual organisms created 
“from scratch” will fail to satisfy the definition of dysfunction proposed 
by Wakefield.1 Another problem arises in the context of transgenic and 
artificially bred organisms. For example, Wakefield’s approach entails the 
implausible, and arguably repugnant, conclusion that oncomice, engi-
neered and bred for a genetic defect that leads to an extremely high inci-
dence of cancer, will meet the dysfunction requirement if they develop 
tumors. I claim that these problem cases constitute a strong objection 
to accepting Wakefield’s etiological account of the dysfunction require-
ment. Finally, I propose a new alternative account of disease in terms of 
the organizational account of biological teleology and normative function 
(mossio, Saborido, and moreno, 2009; Saborido, mossio, and moreno, 
2011). According to the organizational account, the function of organismic 
parts and processes is conferred on them by their current role in the self-
maintaining organization of the organism. I suggest that the dysfunction 
requirement should be stated in terms of the organizational account of 
normative function in order for it to provide an adequate characterization 
of the problem cases discussed.
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In sections II and III, I present Wakefield’s understanding of the dysfunc-
tion requirement and the case for the etiological theory of biological func-
tion to which he appeals. In section IV, I present the two cases, reflection 
on which, I argue, reveals a flaw in the etiological version of the dysfunction 
requirement. In section V, I present the organizational account of normative 
organismic function, and in section VI, I show how it enables accounts of 
disease, which include the dysfunction requirement, to accommodate natu-
rally evolved as well as artifactual and bred and engineered organisms.
II. WAKeFIelD’S tHeory oF DISeASe
Wakefield states his hybrid criterion of disease thus:
A condition is a disorder if and only if (a) the condition causes some harm or dep-
rivation of benefit to the person as judged by the standards of the person’s culture 
(the value criterion), and (b) the condition results from the inability of some internal 
mechanism to perform its natural function, wherein a natural function is an effect 
that is part of the evolutionary explanation of the existence and structure of the 
mechanism (the explanatory criterion) (Wakefield 1992, 384).
In the explanatory criterion, Wakefield characterizes the dysfunction require-
ment in terms of the etiological account of biological function, so let us look 
at what seems to be the main argument for accepting it.
III. WHy ACCePt tHe etIoloGICAl tHeory?2
the case in favor of the etiological theory of function can be summed up 
in terms of its ability to satisfy three desiderata about naturalistic function 
ascriptions to organismic traits:
1. Citing the function of an item explains why it exists;
2. Function ascriptions are normative in the sense that, when we say that 
the function of an item is to do F, we say something about what it is 
supposed to do3;
3. not just any effect of an item is its function, so it must be possible to 
discriminate between an item’s “accidental” effects and its function.
to illustrate, consider the case of the human heart. In accordance with bio-
logical and ordinary usage, the etiological theory claims that the function of 
the human heart is to pump blood. By determining the function of the human 
heart on the basis of its history of natural selection, we can say the following: 
human hearts exist because, by pumping blood, hearts have made a causal 
contribution to the differential survival and reproduction of organisms that 
have them. Furthermore, we can say that even if making a thumping sound 
has occasionally contributed to the survival and reproduction of a human 
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being, it is not a function of the heart because there has not been natural 
selection for that effect. And, finally, because hearts and other organismic 
traits have a natural selection history, we can make sense of the idea that 
biological function ascriptions state what the function bearer is for. A heart 
ought to pump blood because hearts are selected for this effect. A heart 
that is not capable of pumping blood is not functionless, but dysfunctional, 
because it exists for pumping blood, that is to say, because it has a norma-
tive function.
Advocates of the etiological approach often point out that the single most 
problematic implication of alternative approaches is that they do not account 
for the normative dimension of biological function. let me briefly sketch 
the claims and criticisms of three significant dispositional accounts, which, 
in contrast with etiological accounts, claim that the function of an item is 
a causal contribution that it actually makes to some capacity or goal of the 
system.
one of the most influential dispositional approaches is Cummins’ (1975) 
systemic capacity account. Systemic capacity functions are relative to a sali-
ent capacity C of a system S that we want to understand in terms of a “func-
tional analysis” in which a system and its parts are specified. In the systemic 
capacity account, the function of a part X of a system S is to F if and only if X 
has the capacity to F and X’s capacity to F causally contributes to S’s capacity 
to C.4 Although there might be contexts in which systemic capacity functions 
are useful for understanding a complex system, such functions do not say 
what their bearers are supposed to do. the systemic capacity account will 
ascribe functions to all sorts of items that we do not take to be supposed 
to do anything at all. thus, the systemic account will arguably ascribe the 
function of causing earthquakes to tectonic plates (neander, 1991) and take 
it to be a function of clouds to make rain to fill rivers and streams (millikan, 
1989).5
Boorse (1976a, 2002) has suggested that the proper function of an organic 
part is its actual causal contribution to the goal of the organism, which, 
given the way in which organisms are disposed to adjust their activities in 
order to maintain life, he suggests is survival and reproduction. However, 
Boorse’s statistical account of normal function seems unsatisfactory.6 Boorse 
introduces a norm for the function of a trait in terms of the statistically 
normal contribution to survival and reproduction that the trait has within 
the relevant class of organisms (Boorse, 1976a,b). However, the statistical 
account of normativity is problematic because it entails that, for example, 
eyes are only supposed to contribute to vision if that is what eyes actually do 
statistically speaking. A statistical norm is basically a descriptive claim, not a 
normative claim about what a trait is supposed to do. the problem can be 
illustrated by imagining a case in which most people suddenly went blind. 
the statistical account implies that in such a case human eyes would cease 
to have the function of seeing. However, as neander (1991, 182) points out, 
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the correct description of this kind of case certainly seems to be that human 
eyes have the function of seeing, but a majority of them cease to perform 
their function properly.
A similar problem arises with respect to the propensity theory of Bigelow 
and Pargetter (1987). According to the propensity account of function, the 
function of a part of an organism, such as the human heart, is its disposi-
tion to enhance the chance of survival and reproduction, or the fitness, of 
the organism that has it. However, like Cummins and Boorse’s accounts, the 
propensity theory is unable to equip biological functions with a normative 
aspect. As neander points out, a dysfunctioning part does not dispose its 
bearer to survive and reproduce, but according to the propensity theory, 
this is not a case of a part that dysfunctions, but a case of a part that does 
not have a function at all (see neander 1991, 183). For present purposes, 
the most important implication of the etiological theory is that, in addition 
to grounding the teleological aspect of functions, the theory arguably also 
grounds the normativity of functions.
We have seen that the etiological analysis of function is well suited for 
Wakefield’s explanatory criterion of disease because, unlike its dispositional 
competitors, it can make sense of biological dysfunction. However, relying 
on the etiological account is, I will argue, problematic because of the conse-
quences it has with regard to possible future products of synthetic biology 
and existing transgenic and bred organisms.
IV. DISeASe, ArtIFACtuAl orGAnISmS, AnD onComICe
In this section, I will present a line of criticism of Wakefield’s theory that is 
based on current work in synthetic biology. I argue that the possibility of 
artifactual organisms illustrates a problematic feature of understanding the 
dysfunction requirement in terms of the etiological account.
my focus will be on a problem that arises as a consequence of identifying 
the normative function of organismic parts with the effects for which they 
have been selected. the problem is that etiological theories sever the relation 
between normative function and the current causal powers of the function 
bearer. Here my aim is not to assess whether the etiological theory should 
be rejected as a theory of functions on the basis of this and other objections. 
etiologists are well aware of the problem and (as we have seen in section 
III) their standard reply is that we cannot get, from any single theory of func-
tion, both normativity and a dispositional analysis that refers to the current 
causal capacities of the function bearer. nevertheless, the historical aspect of 
the etiological theory results in a problematic consequence for Wakefield’s 
explanatory criterion, and thus, in the next section, I will suggest that the 
explanatory criterion should be stated in terms of an alternative account of 
normative function. But first I will present my criticism, and in order to do 
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so it will be necessary to introduce the emerging field of synthetic biology 
and the notion of an artifactual organism.
Synthetic Biology and Artifactual organisms7
one of the defining aims of synthetic biology is to develop the ability to 
rationally design and fabricate organic systems or parts of such systems that 
have no natural counterparts.8 two approaches are standardly distinguished: 
a top–down approach that aims to create new forms of life by modifying 
extant life forms, and a bottom–up approach that aims to create living sys-
tems from nonliving materials (“from scratch”).
the top–down approach is exemplified by synthetic genomics research, 
such as the widely reported project at the J. Craig Venter Institute. the ulti-
mate goal of the synthetic genome approach is to develop a process that 
allows for large-scale production of microbial life, tailor-made to perform a 
wide range of useful functions, such as generating hydrogen for fuel or cap-
turing excess carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
In 2010, a group of researchers from the J. Craig Venter Institute pub-
lished a widely reported article presenting how they had created the world’s 
first chemically synthesized genome (see Gibson et al., 2010). the research 
group fabricated a copy of the genome of the microorganism Mycoplasma 
mycoides and inserted it into an already living cell that was stripped of its 
original genome. the resulting microorganism, the M. mycoides JCVI-syn1.0, 
is a living, self-replicating cell controlled by a genome that has been spliced 
together by humans. It is worth emphasizing that the synthetic genome is a 
man-made copy of the genome of an already existing bacterium. Commenting 
on the result, one of the members of Venter’s team remarked that:
With this approach we now have the ability to start with a DnA sequence and 
design organisms exactly like we want. (…) We can get down to the very nucleotide 
level and make any changes we want to a genome (Katsnelson, 2010).
the achievement of Venter’s group means that it is now possible for humans 
to initiate a lineage of cells with genomes descended from a synthetic 
genome. An implication is that this will result in organisms and forms of 
life that have never existed before, and, depending on how we draw the 
distinction between modifications of existing life and the creation of entirely 
new forms of life, this may be technically true of Venter’s organism. thus, 
according to Preston (2008), there is a fundamental difference between syn-
thetic biology and traditional biotechnology such as breeding and genetic 
engineering.
In every case of traditional biotechnology—even in the case of transgenic organ-
isms—the genome on which the modification takes place is either the product of 
natural evolutionary processes or is the descendent of such a product. In every case 
in traditional biotechnology, there exists prior to the modification a viable organism 
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on which the manipulation takes place. this is not the case in synthetic biology. 
Synthetic biology does not start with a viable genome and modify it. It starts afresh 
with bio-bricks [DnA sequences with a defined structure and function] possessing 
known properties. there is no existing genome that undergoes modification. In the 
current state of the technology, the synthetically engineered DnA sequences have 
all been inserted into existing single-celled organisms. the idea, however, is not to 
preserve properties of the existing bacteria with modified behaviour. It is to create 
an entirely new organism with DnA constructed in its entirety according to human 
plan. the products of synthetic biology do not borrow any genetic function from 
genomes produced by the historical evolutionary process. to the contrary, synthetic 
biology is guided by the idea of leaving evolution and existing genomes behind in 
order to do a better job of creation with human goals in mind (Preston, 2008, 33).
If Preston is right, then synthetic biology seems to present a challenge to 
the etiological theory of normative function similar to the challenge raised 
by the possibility of instant organisms widely discussed in the literature 
on functions.9 However, I find that Preston overstates the extent to which 
the synthetic organism, resulting from a process of synthesizing a naturally 
occurring genome and inserting it into an enucleated cell, presents a radical 
break with natural evolution.
First, I think it is questionable whether replacing the genome of a cell with a 
synthesized copy of another naturally occurring genome, despite the significance 
of the genome in the functioning of the synthetic cell, amounts to a radical break 
with evolution. After all, a large proportion of the synthetic cell is made up of 
other crucial parts from the original cell. thus, all the subcellular structures (mito-
chondria, liposomes, etc.) necessary for vital processes, such as the metabolism 
of the synthetic cell, are not synthetic, but products of natural evolution.
Second, the synthesized genome in the synthetic cell created by Venter’s 
group (except for a few “watermarks”) is a copy of a naturally evolved genome 
and may therefore be considered a reproduction of a naturally existing 
genome, albeit with an extraordinary causal history. As a matter of fact, syn-
thetic biologists recognize that it is unlikely that humans will be able to design 
a synthetic genome in the near future that is not, largely, a copy of a naturally 
occurring genome with some useful modifications. Despite the impressive 
technical achievements in synthesis and transplantation of genomes, there is 
still a “very poor ability to de novo design (writing) genomes” (Porcar et al., 
2011, 2). thus, I submit that while synthetic genomics may shortcut natural 
evolution in various ways by creating organisms with genomes unlikely to 
arise through natural evolution, it is not likely to produce synthetic organisms 
that constitute a radical break with ordinary evolutionary processes.10
Preston’s description of synthetic biology fits the potential products of the 
bottom–up approach better. Bottom–up synthetic biology is exemplified by 
protocell research. Protocells are characterized as microscopic, self-organiz-
ing, evolving entities that spontaneously assemble from simple organic and 
inorganic materials. In the words of Bedau and Parke (2009, 1):
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Protocells are alive; they are similar to single-celled organisms like bacteria, in that 
they grow by harvesting raw materials and energy from their environment and con-
verting it into forms they can use, they sense and respond to their environment and 
take steps to keep themselves intact and pursue their needs, and they reproduce and 
ultimately evolve (Bedau and Parke, 2009, 1).
one of the leading synthetic biology researchers, martin Hanczyc, provides 
the following description of the creation of simple protocells:
the construction of a protocell begins with different types of both natural and syn-
thetic molecules. the chemical and physical properties of individual molecules gov-
ern their formation into higher-order structures, such as synthetic cell membranes. 
the structures are collections of hundreds of millions of molecules that then possess 
properties not present in the individual molecules. Some structures, such as syn-
thetic protocells, resemble roughly the architecture of living cells with the same size 
scale. (…) Due to the method of construction, the protocell may be programmed to 
contain various chemistries and metabolisms, from simple to complex. the protocell 
can therefore be programmed to consume or produce selectively in a given environ-
ment (Hanczyc, 2011, 27).
the bottom–up approach of protocell research may very well enable syn-
thetic biologists to create a minimal living system from nonliving chemical 
components (i.e., “from scratch”). Artifactual organisms will be self-assem-
bling and self-organizing systems, which are complex enough to instantiate 
crucial life processes such as metabolism, replication, and the capacity to 
evolve without relying on components of natural life forms. Furthermore, 
as Hanczyc points out, protocells may be programmed to respond to their 
environment in useful ways and, thus, serve as instruments, for example, 
for consuming certain unwanted substances (e.g., Co2) and/or producing 
other valued substances that may be used for clean energy production or in 
pharmaceuticals.
In the rest of this paper, I will focus on the possibility of artifactual organ-
isms. unlike a synthetic organism, an artifactual organism is made from 
scratch in the way envisioned by protocell research without using material 
from extant life forms.
the Problem of Artifactual organisms
the possibility of artifactual organisms provides an interesting challenge 
to any definition of the dysfunction requirement that appeals to an etio-
logical theory of function. Consider Arto, an artifactual organism produced 
along the lines suggested by protocell researchers, except that it has not 
been programmed to do anything, but is able to survive and reproduce in 
a petri dish by virtue of having a physical boundary delineated by a mem-
brane, the capacity to transform energy and grow (a metabolic network 
inside the boundary), and a genome that controls metabolism and enables 
replication.11
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one of Arto’s traits is possession of a membrane, which plays a crucial 
role for Arto’s survival and reproduction, because it acts as a selective filter 
that allows only certain kinds of matter to enter and exit the cell. For exam-
ple, some of the matter allowed to enter is transformed by Arto’s metabolism 
to be used for, among other things, the growth and maintenance of the 
membrane itself. Imagine that at some point Arto’s membrane is “damaged” 
in such a way that it is no longer able to control the inflow and outflow of 
matter to the degree required for Arto’s survival, including Arto’s capacity for 
maintaining the membrane itself.12
the etiological theory entails that Arto’s membrane does not have the 
normative function of filtering matter because Arto does not have a selection 
history, even if, in a purely descriptive sense, this is what Arto’s membrane 
does. this means that, according to Wakefield’s analysis, Arto’s membrane 
is not dysfunctional when it ceases to control the flow of matter in and out 
of Arto. Arto’s behavior merely changes in certain ways, but there is nothing 
wrong, and nothing can be wrong, with Arto or Arto’s membrane.13
Wakefield’s theory requires that he reject the claim that Arto satisfies the 
explanatory criterion when its membrane ceases to filter matter. It is impos-
sible for Arto to dysfunction because it does not descend from a population 
of organisms that has been subject to natural selection.14 I will characterize 
Wakefield’s theory as partial because it entails that there are possible sce-
narios in which some organismic systems will not have normative biological 
functions. now, my claim is that we can make Wakefield’s theory complete 
by revising the functional element of the explanatory criterion.
the Problem of oncomice
Another problem facing Wakefield’s theory concerns organisms with traits 
that have been selected for causing what clearly seems to be a defective 
state in the organism. oncomice are mice that have been genetically modi-
fied such that they carry a gene, “the oncogene,” which makes them highly 
susceptible to developing cancer and thus very useful for cancer research.15 
the first oncomouse created by genetic modification may be considered 
to be a mutation, a new variant of mouse, that came to exist in a certain 
environment where the needs and desires of humans in general, and can-
cer researchers in particular, have a significant influence on the selection 
regime. In that environment, there has been selection of oncomice for 
their possession of the oncogene and its consequences for cancer devel-
opment. thus, like cultivated seeds, oncomice have a history of natural 
selection in which humans have played a significant role in determining 
the environment.16 this means that, according to the etiological theory, 
the function of the oncogene in oncomice is to cause cancer since cancer 
is both a consequence of the oncogene and the consequence for which 
there has been selection. Hence, on the etiological theory, contributing 
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to the development of tumors is the normative function of oncogenes in 
oncomice.
now, in the context of Wakefield’s explanatory criterion, the fact that onco-
genes are supposed to cause cancer entails that an oncomouse, whose onco-
gene performs its function, will not satisfy the explanatory criterion. thus, 
Wakefield’s theory implies that oncomice with cancer will not be diseased 
because they do not satisfy the dysfunction requirement. the problem gen-
eralizes to other cases concerning bred and genetically engineered animals, 
which have been selected for their genetic disposition to develop diseases. 
I contend that this is a highly objectionable consequence of Wakefield’s 
explanatory criterion. In the next section, I will sketch an account of norma-
tive function that I think does a better job than the etiological theory when 
it comes to characterizing the functional element of Wakefield’s explanatory 
criterion.
V. An orGAnIzAtIonAl ACCount oF orGAnISmIC FunCtIon
I have argued that Wakefield’s account of disease is unsatisfactory because 
it, by definition, excludes that possible artifactual organisms can be diseased 
and implies that oncomice are not diseased when they develop cancer. In 
this section, I will offer an analysis of organismic function, which better suits 
Wakefield’s statement of the explanatory criterion. more specifically, I will 
argue that the organizational account of function developed by Christensen 
and Bickard (2002), mossio, Saborido, and moreno (2009), and Saborido, 
mossio, and moreno (2011) provides a coherent and plausible analysis of 
biological function that is able to ground the normative aspect of function 
ascriptions. According to the organizational approach, the teleological and 
normative aspects of biological function ascriptions are analyzed in terms 
of the organizational features of organisms and not with reference to their 
origin in natural evolution. In what follows, I will outline the main theses of 
the organizational approach, which I think will be adequate for the purposes 
of this paper. I will focus on the most recent account given by Saborido, 
mossio, and moreno (2011).17
Proponents of the organizational approach begin by pointing out that it 
is by virtue of being self-maintaining systems that organisms realize “the 
relevant causal regime in which the teleological and normative dimensions 
of functions can be adequately naturalized” (Saborido, mossio, and moreno, 
2011, 592). Self-maintenance is characterized as a property of systems that 
are able to exert a causal influence on their surroundings in order to main-
tain (at least some of) the boundary conditions required for their own exist-
ence. A standard case of a self-maintaining system is a candle flame:
[A candle flame] maintains above combustion threshold temperature. It vaporizes 
wax into a continuing supply of fuel. In a standard atmosphere and gravitational 
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field, it induces convection, which pulls in continuing oxygen and removes combus-
tion products. A candle flame, in other words, tends to maintain itself; it exhibits 
self-maintenance (Bickhard, 2000).
Saborido, mossio, and moreno (2011) argue that the fact that a system main-
tains itself makes good sense of the claim that the system is teleological; it 
exists because of something it does. one case that seems to support this 
claim is a living cell, the paradigmatic case of a natural teleological system. 
like Arto described in section IV, a living cell exists partly because of some-
thing it does. For example, cells produce their own physical boundary, their 
membrane, which facilitates the transportation of matter and energy neces-
sary for the survival of the cell, including its capacity for generating and 
repairing the membrane. Perhaps surprisingly, the organizational account 
also claims that flames are teleological systems. By virtue of causing the 
combustion of gases in its vicinity, a flame continues to create the conditions 
under which it is capable of performing that very activity.
the fact that self-maintaining systems are teleological also confers a nor-
mative dimension on their activities. Because self-maintaining systems are 
causally responsible for producing some of the conditions necessary for their 
own existence, they are subject to norms of performance. there are certain 
effects that a cell or a flame is supposed to bring about in order for it to 
persist. In the words of Saborido, mossio, and moreno:
[the] mutual dependence between their existence and activity, which is specific to 
self-maintaining systems, provides an intrinsic and naturalized criterion to determine 
what norms the system, and its parts, are supposed to follow.
the conditions of existence of the system are here interpreted as the norms of its 
own activity: the flame must behave in a specific way, otherwise it would cease to 
exist (Saborido, mossio, and moreno, 2011, 593).
the organizational account provides an alternative and coherent way of 
understanding normative function in organic systems that does not rely on 
the artifact analogy and hence does not involve natural selection. the impor-
tant conclusion is that, according to the organizational theory, self-mainte-
nance is sufficient for teleology and normativity. In section VI, we will see 
how this feature of the organizational account plays out in a revised version 
of Wakefield’s account of disease.
VI. reVISInG tHe eXPlAnAtory CrIterIon
In order to present my alternative formulation of Wakefield’s explanatory 
criterion, it will be helpful to render Wakefield’s explanatory criterion thus:
Etiological Explanatory Criterion (eeC) Condition X is a disease of system 
S only if X results from the failure of a part or process P of S to perform its 
function F, where F is an effect for which P has been naturally selected.
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We have seen that, according to the eeC, neither conditions that are real-
ized by possible artifactual organisms, nor cancer in oncomice, will qualify 
as diseases. my suggestion is that the eeC is revised in terms of the organi-
zational account of normative function:
Organizational Explanatory Criterion (oeC) Condition X is a disease of 
system S only if S is a differentially organized, self-maintaining system, and 
X compromises the ability of S to maintain itself.18
Before I present the features of the oeC that I think makes it superior to 
the eeC. I will briefly explain how the oeC precludes that simple dissipa-
tive structures such as candle flames can satisfy the factual requirement on 
disease. We would like to be able to claim that a candle flame cannot be dis-
eased due to facts about it, not in virtue of sociocultural values. Furthermore, 
considering this question will also bring out in more detail how to under-
stand normative function on the organizational theory.
my suggestion is that candle flames will not be able to satisfy the oeC 
because they are not organized in the following sense:
A self-maintaining system is organizationally differentiated if it produces differ-
ent and localizable patterns or structures, each making a specific contribution to 
the conditions of existence of the whole organization (see mossio, Saborido, and 
moreno, 2009, 826).
that a candle flame is not an organizationally differentiated system is clear 
from the fact that it does not produce and regenerate mutually dependent 
substructures, whose integrated activity enables it to maintain itself. A flame 
merely consumes its components. In contrast, an organizationally differenti-
ated system, paradigmatically a living cell, consists of a variety and hierarchy 
of mutually dependent material structures, whose coordinated activity ena-
bles the cell to maintain itself and, in turn, enables it to maintain those very 
structures. the relation between a cell and its membrane provides a good 
example of differentially organized self-maintenance. the cell membrane is 
a distinct substructure of the cell that filters the matter entering and exiting 
the cell. Furthermore, the membrane filters matter within certain parameters 
appropriate for the maintenance of the coordinated metabolic processes of 
the cell, which, in turn, maintain the membrane.
on the basis of these considerations, we can state the organizational 
account of function in terms of the case of the cell membrane: the mem-
brane serves the function of filtering matter in the cell if and only if by filter-
ing matter, the membrane contributes to the maintenance of the mutually 
dependent processes of the cell, and the membrane is itself produced and 
maintained in virtue of facilitating those processes. more formally, we can 
say that an organismic part or process P serves a function F in relation to a 
differentially organized system S if and only if:
1. By doing F, P contributes to the maintenance of the organization o of S;
2. P is produced and maintained in virtue of the organization o of S.19
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the normative function of an organismic part is thus determined in relation 
to the preservation of the organization of the system. Given the current envi-
ronment, the mutual dependence of the parts and processes constituting the 
organism establishes norms of performance that its parts and processes are 
supposed to meet. In relation to these norms of performance, an alteration 
in the output of a part or process may be said to result in a dysfunction of 
the organismic system. A corollary of the organizational understanding of 
normative function is that a token organ does not dysfunction per se, when 
it fails to perform an activity for which its type has been selected. For exam-
ple, if one of the kidneys in an organism ceases to filter the blood, this will 
only be a dysfunctional condition, if it results in an inadequate filtering of 
the blood in relation to the requirements of the web of mutually depend-
ent processes that constitutes the organism. the kidney, that is incapable of 
performing the effect it has been naturally selected for, does not dysfunction 
on the organizational account.20
With this specification of the organizational theory in hand, consider first 
the problem case of Arto the artifactual organism. revised in terms of the 
organizational account, Arto fulfils the oeC, despite Arto’s lack of a natural 
selection history. For example, Arto’s membrane can be said to have the 
regulation of inflow and outflow of matter as its normative function because 
it is partly by virtue of the causal regime, ensured by this effect of the mem-
brane, that Arto is capable of the metabolic processes that enable it to main-
tain itself, including the production and repair of the membrane.
Second, cashing out the explanatory criterion in terms of organizational 
maintenance does not involve ascribing normativity to parts of the organism 
per se. the parts of an organism are only supposed to do something in rela-
tion to the viability of the whole system, not in relation to norms governing 
their own type. In contrast with the eeC, the oeC does not entail that the 
function of an organismic part or process can be supposed to do something, 
for example, what it has been naturally selected for, which conflicts with the 
viability of the organism. this means that the oeC avoids the conclusion 
that oncomice do not satisfy the explanatory criterion, when they develop 
tumors.21
Finally, it should also be noted that the oeC has the virtue of providing an 
answer to an epistemological problem facing the eeC. It is often quite hard 
to determine even the most recent selection pressures responsible for shap-
ing the evolution of current organisms, and hence it can be quite difficult to 
determine whether or not an organismic part is dysfunctional in terms of its 
selection etiology. In turn this means that the eeC is likely to be practically 
inapplicable, when it comes to determining whether or not some condition 
is a disease. In contrast, the organizational account of organismic function 
makes it possible, even if challenging, to determine whether an organism 
satisfies the explanatory requirement on the basis of observation of its inter-
nal organization and activity in relation to its current environment.
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In sum, the alternative organizational version of the explanatory criterion 
(oeC) is superior to the eeC proposed by Wakefield because it (a) can 
accommodate both artifactual and naturally evolved organisms, (b) avoids 
the possibility of there being a conflict between what an organismic part is 
supposed to do and what is conducive to the self-maintenance of the organ-
ism, and (c) provides not only a nonarbitrary but also a practical way of 
verifying the presence of the factual component of disease.
noteS
 1. throughout the paper, I will assume that nonsentient organisms can be diseased.
 2. the literature on etiological theories of function is vast and addresses many issues that I cannot 
cover here. I will focus on what I take to be the virtues of etiological theory most often appealed to by 
those who defend it. Influential versions of the etiological theory can be found in Wright (1973), millikan 
(1989), neander (1991), Griffiths (1993), Godfrey-Smith (1994), and mitchell (1995).
 3. It is worth noting that when etiologists claim that functions are normative, they do not mean that 
functions supply agents with reasons for action (or belief). nothing about what agents should do follows 
from the fact that leaves are supposed to contribute to photosynthesis.
 4. For a vigorous and influential defense of the importance of Cummins’s account in biological 
research, see Amundson and lauder (1994).
 5. For an interesting criticism of the claim that the systemic capacity account must ascribe the func-
tion of filling rivers and streams to clouds, see Davies (2001, 75).
 6. For an excellent, recent discussion of Boorse’s biostatistical theory of function, see Kingma 
(2010).
 7. this section follows my presentation of synthetic biology in Holm (2012).
 8. A similar characterization can be found in Douglas and Savulescu (2010). Another influential 
definition of synthetic biology is that it is “the design and construction of new biological parts, devices 
and systems, and the redesign of existing, natural biological systems for useful purposes” (SynBerC, 
2012).
 9. For elaborate discussion of how the etiological theory may deal with the alleged possibility of 
instantly created swamp organisms, see millikan (1996) and neander (1996). See Davidson (1987) for the 
original swamp case scenario. Boorse (1976a) raises the question concerning instantly created organism 
in his criticism of Wright (1973).
 10. It is also important to note that synthetic organisms will be subject to natural selection. When 
they reproduce they will, in the appropriate circumstances, bring forth descendants that will constitute a 
population of organisms with members that vary with respect to traits that have an impact on fitness. See 
Sandler and Simons (2012) for similar criticisms of Preston.
 11. my presentation relies on Flint (2012). For a recent overview of protocell research, see rasmussen 
et al. (2009).
 12. Strictly speaking, it will not be correct to assert that Arto’s membrane is damaged when it ceases 
to filter matter because this presupposes that there is something it is supposed to do, and according to 
the etiological account there is not.
 13. Arto’s membrane might still be said to have a normative function according to the etiological 
account, but in that case it would be an artifactual function, that is, a function that has been conferred on 
the membrane by the intentions of the bioengineers who have created Arto. However, artifactual func-
tions do not have the right sort of selection etiology to satisfy the dysfunction requirement as defined by 
Wakefield in the explanatory criterion.
 14. Furthermore, as I have pointed out, Arto might replicate itself, and if the replication process 
results in a population that varies with respect to fitness-enhancing traits, Arto’s descendants will come 
to possess normative functions. However, it is also worth observing that in case Arto’s descendants do 
not come to form such a population, then their parts will not acquire normative functions. thus, whether 
or not Arto’s descendants will come to possess parts with normative functions depends on whether and 
when variation with respect to the right kind of traits arises in the population.
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 15. See Delancey (2004) for a similar point made in connection with his criticism of the account of 
biological interests found in Varner (1998).
 16. See Sperber (2007, 133) for an informative discussion of the case of cultivated seeds.
 17. the following presentation is not intended as an argument for the organizational approach, 
which I will assume is a plausible, if somewhat overlooked, alternative to the well-known etiological 
and dispositional analyses of function. mossio, Saborido, and moreno (2009) and Saborido, mossio, and 
moreno (2011) provide a detailed defense of the view. For important developments and critical discus-
sions of the organizational approach, see Schlosser (1998), mclaughlin (2001), and Delancey (2006). 
Saborido, mossio, and moreno (2011) distinguish two versions of the organizational account in terms 
of whether they focus on the self-reproduction of traits (Schlosser, 1998; mclaughlin, 2001) or on the 
organization of the system (Collier, 2000; Christensen and Bickard, 2002; mossio, Saborido, and moreno, 
2009; Saborido, mossio, and moreno, 2011; Christensen, 2012).
 18. Proponents of the organizational view suggest that we can determine whether a change in a 
part or process of the organism compromises its ability to maintain itself by comparing with alternative 
states that would be better or worse in this respect (see Christensen, 2012, 107). See Schwartz (2007b) for 
discussion of “the line-drawing problem” with regard to Wakefield and Boorse’s theories.
 19. my formulation is based on, but differs slightly from, Saborido, mossio, and moreno (2011, 594).
 20. let me emphasize that the point here is not to reject the value of an etiological understanding 
of dysfunction. the contention is that the organizational account of normative function and dysfunction 
is a genuine alternative that should be appealed to in a statement of the explanatory criterion.
 21. In some cases, organisms exhibit suicidal behavior. It may seem plausible to claim that this kind 
of behavior has a normative function in relation to the reproduction of the species, even if it compromises 
the self-maintenance of individual members of the species. As I see it, this phenomenon concerns the 
sense in which organisms may be considered to be functional parts in the self-maintenance of higher-
level systems such as species and ecosystems. I leave discussion of this issue for another paper.
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